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ABSTRACT 
Amidst the broad divergence in opinion of philosophers and scientists at understanding 
reality that have lent character to the historical epochs of the Philosophical enterprise, the 
crucial realization has always been, of the necessity of Epistemology in our entire program of 
making inquiry into ‘What Is’.1 This realization seems born out of the erstwhile problem of 
knowing. Epistemology, which investigates the nature, sources, limitations and validating of 
knowledge,2 offers a striking challenge here. Since we have no direct access to our world 
around us, outside of the subjective experience offered us by our senses, we are handicapped 
at making comparisons of our beliefs with a concrete world, out there, or with elements of the 
world. Our statements about the world seem to stand alone, buffeted against the intimidating 
tide of possible contradicting circumstances. Our putative claims to knowledge, therefore, 
face the exigency of justification. Ayer, expressing the urgency of resolving this persisting 
lacuna, provides an alternative criterion of knowing, as ‘having the right to be sure’.3 Thus, it 
is this deep-seated concern that has evolved, over time, to become the primary thrust of the 
project of Epistemology, raising the controversy over which, of Epistemology or 
Metaphysics, is to be accorded the prime status of first philosophy.  
However, Aquinas is wise to build his epistemological premise on a firm metaphysical 
support, clarifying the needed development from being to knowledge. For, being has to first 
exist to constitute the object of perception, belief and knowledge. Accordingly, our 
exposition of Aquinas’ epistemology will first take a cursory look at the theoretical and 
historical background to Aquinas’ Philosophy, before offering a general characterization of 
his theory of knowledge. Then, the paper will discuss his concept of sense perception as a 
basis for all knowing, followed closely by an analysis of Cognition and Scientia.  
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Aquinas is largely apathetic to the modern epistemological controversy of which of 
epistemology or metaphysics is to be honoured as first philosophy.4 Yet though, Aquinas may 
be averse to tackling this concern, “he does not build his philosophical system around a 
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theory of knowledge”, rather, he founds it on the “basis provided by the other parts of his 
system, in particular, his metaphysics and psychology”.5 Consequently, building significantly 
on his concepts of psychology and metaphysics, Aquinas exposes the concept of knowledge 
through the thematic headings of Sense perception, Cognition, Scientia, and the 
Foundationalist agenda of justification.  
Born around the year 1225, based strongly upon evidence of his death on the morning of the 
7th of March, 1274, after a vibrant life and career of about forty-nine years, Saint Thomas 
Aquinas was one of the most influential figures of his time. He was descended from a rich 
historic Lombard family, born at the castle of Roccasecca, near the small town of Aquino, 
which lies between Naples and Rome. His father, who was the count of Aquino, nourished 
the selfish desire of someday, seeing his son enjoying an exalted ecclesiastical position. 
Hence, Saint Thomas had his early education under the scrupulous direction of the 
Benedictine monks of Monte Cassano, and later, in 1239, went to further his education at the 
University of Naples, previously founded by Emperor Frederick II in 1224.6 While at Naples, 
however, Saint Thomas fell in love with the Dominican life, which later culminated in his 
embracing the Dominican garb, despite the disapproval of his family. His later assignment to 
study under Saint Albert the Great, the erudite Dominican theologian, in the North, was 
particular in the shaping of his great love for the scriptures and for dogmatic theology. ‘The 
Dumb Ox’, as he was fondly called particularly due to his taciturnity, was greatly 
impregnated with Albert’s thought within the four years of his stay.7 As Albert testifies with 
lively conviction, “We call him a dumb ox, but he will make resound in his doctrine such a 
bellowing, that it will echo throughout the entire world”. Two of Aquinas’ major 
contributions to Scholasticism were his Summa Contra Gentiles, and his Summa Theologica. 
Neither of these works may be considered as a philosophical treatise. This is based on its 
deviation from the post-modern ideas about the nature and scope of philosophy, and 
furthermore, upon Aquinas’ own delimitation of the frontiers of philosophy and dogmatic 
theology as he discusses in the opening chapters of his Summa Contra Gentiles.8  
Of the many events that contributed to shaping Aquinas’ thought, the historical event of the 
Renaissance was remarkably crucial to his landmark contributions in Philosophy and 
theology. Coppleston argues on the pressing importance of not overlooking the unbroken 
continuity of theory that exists between the Medieval, the Renaissance and the Post-
Renaissance Philosophies, and expresses this as the key to understanding the history of 
Philosophy. Aquinas’ arrival in Paris around the middle of the Thirteenth Century witnessed 
the general ambience of apathy towards literature of antiquity. Evidently, though, Ovid’s 
works, as well as a few other works of antiquity, met with a yet dwindling popularity among 
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the people of the time.9 The general character of indifference for these works however, was 
soon to change, as there was a gradual reappraisal of philosophic reason from the bosom of 
antiquity. This is also particularly vital to understanding the development of Aquinas’ 
thought, because, in purely theoretical terms, Aquinas’ amazing status in the prevalent school 
of Thirteenth Century Scholasticism, finds its origin centred at the heart of an “authentic 
rebirth”. This rebirth furnishes a discovery of the Ancient culture of philosophy. Put in more 
lucid terms, it witnesses the discovery of the prime place of Aristotle in understanding 
theology, and summarily, the assimilation of Greek reason in Christian theology. As Aquinas 
points out, “The study of Philosophy is not done in order to know what men have thought, 
but rather to know how the truth herself stands”. Hence, it is in this respect that Aquinas 
becomes a most fervent disciple of Aristotelian thought. It was the inauguration of this rebirth 
that saw the rise of Aristotelianism, a sensational event in the rediscovery of antiquity that 
also was to consequently be the determining factor in the development of the work of Saint 
Thomas.10  
I 
Generally described as the ‘Christian Aristotle’, Aquinas models a good deal of his 
philosophy on the philosophic system of this luminary giant. Aquinas wields a convincing 
realist support for human knowledge, as reason is open to reality, and reality to reason.11 He 
stresses the experimental foundation of human knowledge, in conceding that the objects of 
sense experience furnish us with viable knowledge. Aquinas makes mincemeat of the theory 
of innate knowledge, as put forward by Plato. Man is not endowed with innate ideas at the 
time of his birth. The human mind, from birth, is basically in potentiality to knowledge, 
though, gifted with the capability of abstracting and forming ideas.12 At birth, the human 
mind is a tabula rasa, that is, “a clear tablet in which nothing is written”.13   He, in 
consequence, criticizes the position of Augustine, who maintains that our “intellectual 
knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses”. Aquinas, nevertheless, does not align fully on 
the plane of Greek empiricism, found in the writings of Democritus, often described under 
the terms of Hard or Radical Empiricism. These hold that all our knowledge was derived 
from the mere impression brought about by sensible things, impressions which they allege to 
be caused by a discharge of images.14 Aquinas, on the other hand, goes off a tangent, as his 
mentor, Aristotle, gravitating between the two extremes of Empiricism and Rationalism. This 
is so because though he acknowledges sense experience as the starting point of all human 
knowing, he does not limit human knowledge simply to sense experience. Hence, Aquinas 
states pointedly, 
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Aristotle chose[s] the middle wise. For with Plato, he agreed that intellect and 
sense are different, But he held that the sense has not its proper operation 
without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul 
alone, but of the composite...Aristotle agreed with Democritus...that the 
operations of the sensible part are caused by the impressions of the sensible on 
the sense, not by a discharge...15    
To this extent, his position is often described under the philosophical distinction, Moderate or 
Soft Empiricism. Aquinas is wary of confusing man with the animals as the hard empiricist 
does, in reducing all knowledge to passive sensation, and also, he cautiously avoids mistaking 
man for the angelic order, as the rationalist, in believing we possess some divine power of 
“mental telepathy” with the divine mind in their ambitious claim to innate knowledge. 
Instead, there is the proper classification of man in Aquinas’ typical Aristotelian “golden 
mean” between the two extremes.  
Hence, knowing as an activity of man is characteristically immanent, as the known forms are 
present in the knowing mind not as material objects but in their abstract forms. However, one 
needs to be careful of making the supposition that Aquinas endorses phenomenalism or is 
hand-in-glove with the Copernican revolution of Kant, both of which subtly deny the 
relevance of a concrete extra-mental existence. Thomas expresses confidently the material 
and extra-mental existence of the objects of experience and posits that these are only present 
in the cognizing faculty of the mind only by the formal identity between both.16 His emphasis 
is therefore, on the indispensable factor of sense experience in the attainment of knowledge. 
II 
Copleston argues against the common misconception of according the Classic British 
Empiricists the luxury of discovering the fundamental role of sense-perception in human 
cognition.17 Still, the role of sense perception in the acquisition of knowledge has always been 
pictured with a delimiting factor of doubt. Scepticism harshly criticizes the reliability of our 
senses in affording us sure knowledge about the world. As Descartes exposes in his 
epistemological program of systematic doubt,  
How often has it happened to me that in the night I dreamt that I found myself 
in this particular place, that I was dressed and seated near the fire, whilst in 
reality I was lying undressed in bed...But in thinking over this I remind myself 
that on many occasions I have in sleep been deceived by similar illusions, and 
in dwelling carefully on this reflection I see so manifestly that there are no 
certain indication by which we may clearly distinguish wakefulness from sleep 
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that I am lost in astonishment. And my astonishment is such that it is almost 
capable of persuading me that I now dream.18 
Further to this tendentious inconsistency, our senses yet present us with another dilemma. 
Most times, there exist a subtle dichotomy between our experience of objects and the objects 
of experience themselves. What we perceive as sweet, may appear bitter to someone else. In 
such cases, we would not be able to sufficiently characterize the object of experience. To this 
effect, we hear such clichés as “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”, attributed to Margaret 
Wolfe Hungerford. At other times, closely similar to Descartes’ scenario, our senses offer us 
the confusing muddle of illusions, delusions and distortions of the ‘real’.   
Against this tide of epistemological pessimism, Aquinas counters with the Aristotelian 
argument that the human mind can no doubt attain certain knowledge, but that this may not be 
realized outside of sensible experience, hence, the senses alone can furnish man with objects 
of knowledge. Hence, Aquinas does not nurse the sceptic’s distrust of the senses. The strength 
of his position is reflected in his proposition that even the soul’s knowledge of itself is 
predicated in its acts, and not in its essence, that is to say that the soul abstracts intelligible 
species from its acts. Unlike the rationalists, such as Descartes, the cogito does not come first, 
but last. We don’t begin with “I think therefore, I am”, rather we assert “I see something, 
therefore, I am not just an object seen but a seer”.19 Put bluntly, Aquinas simply, posits that 
we cannot know anything without the presence of a phantasm or sense impression: nihil in 
intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu.20 His position is hinged on the consideration of man 
as composite (compositum) of an intellectual soul and a corporeal body. The intellectual soul, 
he held, was the “primary principle of nourishment, sensation, and local movement, and 
likewise, of understanding”.21 Therefore, the intellectual soul was the form of the body. Both 
were properly united, irrespective of their distinctive characters of incorruptibility and 
corruptibility respectively. As he states matter-of-factly,  
Nature never fails in necessary things: therefore, the intellectual soul had to be 
endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of 
feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal 
instrument. Therefore, it behoved the intellectual soul to be united to a body 
fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.22 
Aquinas believes that the senses in their natural state (that is in a healthy sense organ) are 
capable of mirroring objects as they really are. He, therefore, maintains that the natural mind 
is able to grasp the permanent and stable in objects of sense. At this juncture, it is important to 
establish that, quite, unlike the phenomenologist, Aquinas supports the independent existence 
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of corporeal objects. Yet, despite the constant flux associated with these changing objects of 
sense, we can abstract from matter, its essence, from the particular, the universal.23  
Aquinas, espousing Avicenna’s categories, distinguishes between the exterior senses and the 
interior senses. ‘Sense’, he states, ‘is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the 
exterior sensible’. This implies that there is an exterior cause of the immutation which is 
perceived by the sense, and it is the diversity of these exterior causes that give rise to the 
distinctive sensitive powers and their consequent sensory organs. Natural immutation is 
clearly distinguished from spiritual immutation in that, the former communicates its form that 
is received physically, while the latter communicates its form spiritually or metaphysically. 
The external sensory powers are then, the sense of sight, the sense of hearing, the sense of 
smelling and the sense of touch and taste. All these communicate both forms of immutation 
with the exception of the sense of sight that communicates only a spiritual immutation.24 
Coupled with experience offered by these exterior senses, there are the interior senses which 
represent the sensitive power that preserves the sensations received in the former. They are 
listed as common sense, phantasy, imagination and the estimative and memorative powers. 
While in the exterior sense, physical sensations are perceived, in the interior senses, intentions 
are perceived. The sensory species that were received in the exterior senses were transmitted 
to the interior senses, organs which Aquinas located in the brain. While the forms received 
through the senses were taken in by the proper sense and the common sense, the phantasy or 
imagination was responsible for their retention and preservation. The function of 
apprehension of intentions, not gotten through the senses, rested with the estimative power, as 
well as, its retention dependent on the memorative power. These interior senses were 
responsible for the further required step in actual human cognizing. Aquinas, also, makes a 
needed distinction between man and the animals, in that while the latter intuits intentions, 
through natural instinct or the natural estimative, the former does so by the cogitative. As a 
consequence, the senses simply were relevant in furnishing us with raw material for the entire 
process of knowing.  
III 
In the entire process of intellectual cognition, Aquinas lays strong emphasis on the crucial part 
played by the sensory. Indeed, He does not, in any way, underestimate the necessary 
intervention of the human intellect in the perfection and completion of the knowing process. 
The important raw material furnished by the interior senses, especially the phantasy or 
imagination are termed phantasms, that is, the impression gotten from the corporeal object, 
e.g. sound, taste, colour, etc.25 These phantasms are the sensory species that are worked on by 
the human intellect. Aquinas however, distinguishes the intellect in two modes based on their 
functions in cognition: the first expresses the intellect “in potentiality with regards to things 
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intelligible”, termed the passive or possible intellect, in Aristotelian jargon.26 It is, on the 
other hand, the function of the active or agent intellect to work on the phantasms, abstracting 
the universal element in the particulars of sense impressions of sound, taste, colour, etc. and 
producing in the passive intellect, the species impressa.27 Abstraction, as an Aristotelian 
concept implies the isolation of universal elements from particulars. Hence, for different 
particular phantasms of red objects, the active intellect isolates “redness” as a concept. This 
concept, then, is received by the possible or passive intellect, where it finds its place in the 
full sense as the verbum mentis.  
These universals are properly understood as forms. So, the human mind in the process of 
cognition receives a form. “Every act of cognition is in accordance with some form, which is 
the source of cognition in the one cognizing”.28 Cognition, therefore, entails some formal 
identity between the object of cognition and the cognizing subject.29 Cognition is a process of 
change, where the cognizing subject undergoes something that requires his coming to be in a 
state which they previously were not. This cognitive change, in hylomorphic terms, expresses 
“a process by which some matter or subject (hyle) comes to possess some form or property 
(morphe) that it previously lacked”.30 This is often termed as the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
doctrine of the “identity” of the knower in the known. For Aquinas explains that ‘knowledge 
is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower [and] the thing known is in the 
knower according to the mode of the knower’.31 This assimilation is quite different from the 
natural mode, whereby there is an ordinary change:  
One kind of assimilation occurs because of an agreement in nature…but this 
kind is not required for knowledge. Another kind of assimilation occurs 
through information, which kind is required for cognition – just as sight is 
assimilated to colour, when the pupil is informed by its species.32 
The forms received are, however, in intentional or representational states, that is, they are in a 
form whereby when received by the cognizing subject are used to make other things. Aquinas, 
relevantly, adopts the term species, a synonym for representation to classify these forms. To 
this effect, Aquinas distinguishes between sensory and intellective species. The former, we 
have previously seen, are the received phantasms worked on by the intellect, while the latter 
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are the product of the intellect’s consideration. They are only universals, e.g. round, metallic, 
etc. As Aquinas states, 
Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual 
matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are 
abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect, hence it follows 
that through the intellect, we can understand these objects as universal; and 
this is beyond the power of sense.33 
Despite all these, cognition is yet clearly not itself knowledge, for we can also possess false 
cognition.34 In short, cognition, for Aquinas, is broader than knowledge. To this inadequacy, 
Aquinas presents Scientia as his notion of knowledge. Yet Scientia seems inadequate to fully 
explicate the concept of knowledge. Accordingly, Aquinas links up his notion of Scientia 
with the support of inferential justification. 
IV 
It is doubtful that Aquinas has any corresponding concept to tally with the English word: 
“knowledge”. His notion of scientia, which is his closest equivalent, is built firmly on his 
preceding notion of cognition. Here, scientia is a species of cognition, but further, cognition 
of the truth of what is cognized. The self-reflexive capacity of the human intellect discussed 
earlier, offers the cognitive mind not only the acceptance of epistemic propositions but the 
grounds or reasons for accepting them. Scientia is the paradigm for knowledge; it is complete 
and certain cognition of the truth of something. Its propositions serve as the starting point of 
all philosophizing. However, it is to be noted that the project of Aquinas is far from complete, 
given that our propositions often hit wide of the mark. The paradigmatic scientia is often 
unattainable, as the words of later Popper attest, when he contends that we can only arrive at 
a mere “approximation of the truth” (verisimilitude). Aquinas’ summation can be revised to 
admit of both the strict scientia as well as a secondary scientia. The former will entail 
propositions within the precinct of logic and geometry, while the latter will cover many other 
sorts of propositions.35  
Aquinas puts forward the Aristotelian theory of demonstration as representative of Scientia. 
The demonstrative syllogism whereby a given belief, P, is held on the basis of some 
epistemic grounds, which lend credible support to its conclusion, gives the logical structure 
of Scientia. For example, a certain Mr. A holds a belief that P, and when questioned supports 
his belief with some other propositions, which can then be regarded as the premises to his 
belief, and these lend credible support to his belief that P. In the context of demonstration, 
Aquinas distinguishes between the two aforementioned types of scientia. As effects, which 
are the metaphysically posterior facts, are more epistemically accessible to us than the causes, 
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which stand as metaphysically prior and explanatory, Aquinas extends two arms of 
demonstration. In some cases, accordingly, we may infer the cause from the effect (on the 
basis of necessary causal principles), rather than the effect from the cause as is usual. This 
case is what Aquinas terms as ‘factual demonstration’ (demonstrationes quia), as they do not 
offer explanation for a fact. However, the other scenario presents us with ‘explanatory 
demonstrations’ (demonstrationes propter quid), which offer explanation or give the cause of 
an effect. In distinguishing both senses of scientia, thus, Aquinas aligns explanatory 
demonstrations as requirement for paradigmatic scientia, while placing factual 
demonstrations alongside secondary scientia. Unlike the level of intellectual cognition, which 
lends simply ‘understanding’, Scientia expresses the making of judgments. It is judgment 
that, hence, leads to scientia. He says thus, that, “Judgment goes with the certitude of 
scientia. And it is because we cannot have certain judgment about effects except by analysis 
leading to first principles that this part of human reason is called ‘analytics’”.36 We 
understand things by ‘composition and division’.37 These judgments are arrived at by 
syllogistic inference. Thus, Aquinas expresses, 
[Aristotle] says that because we believe a thing has been concluded and have 
scientia with respect to it by virtue of the fact that we possess a demonstrative 
syllogism, and we possess this insofar as we have scientia with respect to the 
demonstrative syllogism, it is necessary not only that we antecedently cognize 
the first principles of the conclusion but also that we cognize them more than 
the conclusion38 
As the above makes clear, there exist some first principles, thus, upon which Scientia ought 
to be grounded. Some propositions derive their justification based on an inference (per 
demonsrationem), however, there exist others that have their positive epistemic status non-
inferentially, by virtue of themselves (per se). These propositions (per se nota) are Aquinas’ 
first principles, the foundations of Scientia. They are also understood as self-evident 
principles (principia per se nota), as they are not simply necessary, but also give information 
about reality.39 Support for his distinction between the strict scientia and the secondary 
scientia, also comes up here, as can be gleaned from the priority of sensory cognition over 
intellective cognition. As a result, the particular is both prior to and better known than the 
universal. Consequently, such immediate propositions can function for us as epistemic first 
principles, grounding what is for us, scientia.40  
To buttress his argument, Aquinas argues for the self-justifying presence of these first 
principles by attacking rival principles of justification. Firstly, he strikes off the Aristotelian 
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37 Aquinas, Thomas. ST, Ia, q. 85, a. 5, p. 437. 
38 Aquinas, Thomas. Posterior Analytics, I, q. 6, a. 2. 
39 Copleston, Frederick. Aquinas, p. 30. 
40 Macdonald, Scott. “Theory of Knowledge” in Kretzmann, Norman and Stump, Eleonore. 1993. The 
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regress argument by stressing the need for a non-inferential justification to put an end to a 
backward regress ad infinitum of inferential justifications. Secondly, he argues against the 
vacuousness of circular reasoning as a source of justification, pointing to the bulwark of self-
evident foundational principles as a way out of such vacuity.  
Aquinas’ notion of Scientia further implicates the relevant concept of truth. As a realist, one 
would expect Aquinas to further the correspondence theory of truth; however, he makes a 
slight deviation from the norm. For Aquinas, our concepts about the world are true not as 
much as they are a picture or copy of the real form in the world. On the other hand, it should 
represent the form of matter outside the mind as it is in the cognitive mind. So he says, “The 
soul of man is in a way all things”.41 This is rather an identity theory of truth. The 
correspondence theory of truth regards ideas in the mind as objects, things, e.g. copies, 
representations, etc. Aquinas, moreover, treats ideas not as material signs, but as formal 
signs. Aquinas’ understanding of truth takes us a leap further into the divine. This is 
incumbent on the fact that Aquinas believes that the truth resides in the divine intellect. 
Hence, Aquinas finds it intriguing to consider the aspect of knowledge of immaterial 
substances, as well as the possibility of knowledge in separated substances. 
V 
Aquinas first argues on the possibility of knowledge of immaterial substances by the human 
intellect. Already, his preceding notion of sense perception as the basis for all knowledge 
precludes such a possibility. Consequently, it can be put forward, as Copleston presents, that 
the human mind cannot in this life attain a direct knowledge of immaterial substances, which 
are not and cannot be the object of the senses. The question as to the capability of the mind to 
rise above the senses to attain knowledge of God, who is not an object of sense, therefore, 
surfaces.  
Though, a prima facie representation of Aquinas’ epistemic program may discredit the 
attempt at ascribing man the capability of knowledge of immaterial substances, a more 
scrupulous consideration of his epistemology will reveal a glaring fact. For Aquinas, the 
senses were necessarily determined to a particular kind of object, unlike the intellect, which 
being immaterial, was the faculty of apprehending being. As such, the intellect was directed 
towards all being. Copleston explains Aquinas’ position, saying that “the object of the 
intellect is the intelligible: nothing is intelligible except in so far as it is in act, partakes of 
being, and all that is in act is intelligible in so far as it is in act, i.e. partakes of being”.42 As 
the movement of the intellect is directed towards all being, therefore, the human intellect is 
not simply restricted to sensible being. The human intellect can therefore, proceed beyond 
sense to consider immaterial beings, in so far as they are manifested in and through the 
sensible world. However, Aquinas notes that the human intellect cannot by its own power, 
comprehend God directly, but requires the instrumentality of nature to reach the divine. 
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These effects of God as are intelligible in nature, manifest God to the extent that the intellect 
can come to understand the nature of God. Summarily, Aquinas posits that we can know God 
ut causam, et per excessum, et per remotionem. Consequently, it would be proper to assume 
that the intellect cannot attain a natural knowledge of immaterial substances. However, the 
active intellect only does so, by reading off a relation to the immaterial being from the 
sensible representations it perceives. As strong support to his thesis, Aquinas put forward his 
argument for the existence of God, as is made intelligible in nature. His famous Quinque viae 
consists in a five-fold argument based on motion, causation, contingency of beings, degree of 
perfection, and from design.43 Aquinas argues further that though these proofs testify to us 
about the existence of God, they do not describe what God is. Hence, he terms these proofs, 
the via negativa – the negative way, as they do not give us a positive conception of God, but 
lead us to remove certain ideas from our conception of God.44  
Concerning knowledge in separated substances, Aquinas says that the soul even when 
separated from the body by death still possesses its own proper act of understanding, as the 
power is not a sensory power. Aquinas’ understanding of separated substances, however, 
extends beyond merely the disembodied soul of man, covering also the angels. The term, 
‘separated’ designates the absence of sensible matter in those souls that do not or no longer 
share our material existence. Knowledge in such substances, given that they do not possess 
the sensory organs, is attained without recourse to sense perception or phantasms. However, 
Aquinas does not submit that these attain spiritual knowledge through innate ideas rather that 
they understand by means of participation arising for the influence of the Divine light.45   
VI 
It is indubitable that Aquinas’ contribution in epistemology is most crucial in the 
development of Empiricism. However, like all empiricists, Aquinas seems to narrow down 
the possibility of human knowledge to simply the sensible. He disregards without any 
evidential support the position of innate ideas, as put forward by Plato. Aquinas is so 
confident that our human senses can offer us certain knowledge of the world. However, 
Hume, though an empiricist like Aquinas, offers a critique of this summation in his position 
of scepticism. He argues against our claim to certain knowledge through the senses, as they 
may simply be deceiving us. His distrust of the senses is not without reason, as recent studies 
in psychology expose the problem of perception, as is presented in illusions and delusions. 
Our senses are not altogether reliable. Descartes’ account of dreaming, as an example of a 
hallucination, suffices to point out the limitation that can be presented us in perceptual 
experience. If, then, the source of knowledge according to Aquinas is dubitable, it is, 
consequently, difficult to ground his claim to knowledge as certain. Furthermore, Aquinas in 
lending support to his thesis on the primacy of the senses in furnishing all knowledge 
presented his five ways to discerning God, via negativa. However, he makes an ontological 
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leap in virtually all the categories, as he cannot fully align his previous thesis of sensible 
primacy with knowledge of the divine.   
Despite the loopholes that may seem evident in Aquinas’ Epistemology, his program of 
making inquiry into ‘What Is’, which is the ultimate resolve of Epistemology, is worth the 
effort. His philosophical system serves as the basis for the growth of Christian theology, as 
well as the development of a viable basis for the later British Empiricists.  
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